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Amy DiPierro 
Swarthmore College, May 2013 
Sweet Freedom: Smokers’ Rights & the Rebranding of Philip Morris 
Abstract: This paper discusses how Philip Morris invoked strong American values to defend its 
own corporate speech as well as “smoker’s rights.” In particular, it examines Philip Morris 
Company’s Bill of Rights advertising campaign of the early 1990s, especially focusing on an 
advertisement featuring Everett Alvarez, a prisoner of war during Vietnam. This strategy reveals 
how Philip Morris was able to manipulate the public conversation about smoking from one about 
health and disease to one about human rights and freedoms. 
 
On May 27, 1990, thousands of newspaper readers paging through Parade 
Magazine were greeted by what seemed, at first glance, like a public service 
announcement. The full-page advertisement, found in this weekly Sunday insert in 
newspaper markets across the United States, neither pictures nor mentions any particular 
product (Figure 1). On the left two thirds of the page, a man in a black suit and tie looks 
askance from the camera taking his picture; on the right, five whole paragraphs of copy 
explain who the man is and what liberty means to him. “You’ll never know how sweet 
freedom can be,” reads his italicized quote in the upper right hand corner of the page, 
“unless you’ve lost it for 8½ years.”  
The copy goes on to identify the speaker and image as “EVERETT ALVAREZ, JR. 
VIETNAM POW”. Alvarez, it says, “was starved, beaten and forced to endure unspeakable 
torture” while in captivity. Upon his release, he remembers that “Everything I touched 
felt good. Everything I ate tasted good. Everything smelled so good.” His quote ends, and 
in the lower right-hand corner, the regal seal of Philip Morris Companies (PMC) is 
followed by a note inviting readers to support “the National Archives' celebration of the 
200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights,” by ordering their own free copy of the Bill of 
Rights via a 1-800 number or Washington, D.C. address. 
 Philip Morris – the home of Miller Light, Kraft Mac and Cheese, and (most of all) 
Marlboro cigarettes – had been running this ad and a variety of ones like it for months. 
The “Alvarez advertisement” or “Alvarez ad” – as I’ll call it for the rest of this paper – is 
only one in PMC’s 1989 to 1991 Bill of Rights ad campaign. It is just one advertisement, 
in a series of ads, in a catalogue of other cigarette ads, in an archive of modern images 
promoting tobacco dating back to the dawn of advertising in the 19th century. But by 
reading an artifact like this in context, rather than in isolation as above, historians of 
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public health and public health advocates can get a sense for why Philip Morris created 
this image and how those Sunday morning readers – and so many others since – 
consumed it.  
I should mention that the ad series never mentions cigarettes. As I’ll show, many 
readers nonetheless interpreted it as a cigarette ad. The firm insisted – publically, and 
even in some private records it later released through court cases – that the goal of the ads 
was to rebrand PMC as a multi-industry company standing up for American freedom. 
This study, then, explores the gap between this stated purpose and consumer reactions, 
and asks why this image provokes powerful reactions in favor of and against smoking. 
This story is not really about the Alvarez Ad. I return to the image as an example 
and reference, but it’s not my focus. This is a story about the dimensions so easily 
flattened when we consider smoking only as a public health issue. Cigarettes and 
smoking can seem to be almost completely contained within the boundaries of public 
health regulation today, but this is actually a very recent phenomenon. Medical consensus 
about the threat of smoking began in earnest in the United States following the 1964 
Surgeon General’s Report, but it wasn’t until 1986’s “The Health Consequences of 
Involuntary Smoking” – which emphasized the danger of “environmental tobacco 
smoke” (ETS), or secondhand smoke – that the public health establishment created 
enough momentum to call for widespread advertising regulations and bans.1 In 1990, 
proposals to curtail tobacco advertising were still a flashpoint on the Congressional 
agenda. Cigarette ads were no less controversial when their influence filtered into 
elementary school classrooms, colored discussions of domestic and international politics, 
and dominated newspaper headlines. 
But before 1986, and certainly before 1964, smoking was not a controversial 
subject. It carried cultural meanings of glamor, sexuality, and rebellion, of gender, 
national, and ethnic identity, and (most relevant to this particular study) of patriotism, 
freedom, and rights. These meanings existed – and have continued to persist – long 
before medical discourse took center stage in smoking discussions. In other words, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General." (1986). 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCPP.pdf. 
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understand how smokers and nonsmokers respond to public health discourses, we must 
also identify meanings they have received from other sectors of society, including  
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Figure 1. The Alvarez advertisement. 
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advertising. I am tracing how Philip Morris Companies reproduced one set of meanings  
with a formidable genealogy. This study slowly zooms out to consider these meanings of 
military, patriotism, and rights, to explain how PMC designed a public relations 
campaign that pushed regulations on cigarette advertising, and to survey the reactions to 
that campaign. It then briefly zooms in on Alvarez – on the very personal reactions his 
picture provoked in other war veterans, and finally, on the man himself.  
If we look at cigarette advertising like this, it becomes very obvious that the 
decision to smoke is never one the smoker makes in dialogue with doctors or public 
health experts alone. Voices from the media and political spheres – voices that are 
deceptively complex – are necessarily a part of that conversation. For this reason, 
consumers respond to advertising in unpredictable, novel, and multiple ways; public 
health is not all-powerful in dictating reactions. Neither, I should note, is Philip Morris. 
PMC is a powerful character in this story, but that does not mean they exert mind control 
over consumers. The Bill of Rights campaign was clever, perhaps even ingenious, but its 
readers rejected, absorbed, or more ambivalently negotiated its meaning in equal parts.  
Background: patriotism, the military, and rights in cigarette advertising 
Cigarettes & C-rations 
Advertising that connects tobacco, patriotism, and the military go back at least to 
the 19th Century. In Smoking in British popular culture: 1800-2000, historian Matthew 
Hilton notes the themes of military might and national pride in the United Kingdom’s 
mass advertisements for cigarettes during World War I.2 This kind of imagery first 
proliferated in the United States during the Second World War, paralleling the general 
increase of smoking among the population.3 During the war, cigarettes were ubiquitous 
for men at the front; they were supplied free of charge in the American soldier’s K and C-
rations, alongside crackers, coffee, dextrose pills, and lemonade mix.4 Cigarette brands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Matthew Hilton, Smoking in British popular culture: 1800-2000, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 
2000), chap. 4. 
3 American Lung Association, "Trends in Tobacco Use," American Lung Association - Research and Program Services 
Epidemiology and Statistics Unit (2011), http://www.lung.org/finding-cures/our-research/trend-reports/Tobacco-Trend-
Report.pdf 
4 Mark Henry, The US Army in World War II: The Mediterranean , (London, UK: Osprey Publishing, 
2000)http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?3551-US-Army-Rations-World-War-II 23-24. 
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even became the namesakes for a series of camps outside of Le Havre, France from 1944-
45: Camp Old Gold and Camp Chesterfield, among others.5  
 The war coincided with a golden age of mass marketing. Cigarette manufacturers 
used revenues to invest in the newest techniques of advertising. Confounding patriotism 
and consumerism, they (like so many wartime industries) urged readers to “Buy More 
Bonds” and, of course, more cigarettes. Sailors posed on ships with their cigarettes, pilots 
grinned with a carton in hand on planes, girlfriends offered smokes to their returning 
soldier beaus. The message was simple: buy cigarettes and you’ll support the war effort. 
 By the Vietnam War, an unpopular conflict by most measures, advertisers were 
less eager to associate themselves with the image of the soldier or the war veteran. In 
practice, however, cigarettes remained a part of many soldiers’ lives. For one thing, it 
wasn’t until 1972 – the very end of the war – that cigarettes were removed from C-
rations.6 Whether supplied free of charge or not, oral histories and other sources indicate 
smoking was ubiquitous in the armed forces during the conflict. A Vietnamese soldier in 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam recalled how the breakfast of an American GI “has 
to include coffee and cigarettes,” despite the danger of giving away one’s position by 
these two strong smells.7 One Vietnam War reporter remembered an anecdote about a 
General crouching in an awkward pushup position in the mud in an effort to keep his 
cigarettes dry.8 In terms of anecdotes, as well as sales, the cigarette remained among the 
American soldier’s closest comrades. 
It would be a mistake to think tobacco firms had forgotten about the military 
market just because they no longer featured military men and women in their ads. To the 
contrary, they explicitly identified a potential market to be tapped. In 1967, a confidential 
memo from British American Tobacco observed that one of their directors “was fairly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 "The Cigarette Camps," Skylighters: The Story of the 225th AAA Searchlight Battalian (blog), 
http://www.skylighters.org/special/cigcamps/cigintro.html. 
6 "Peas and pork to pasta and pesto: Feeding the troops through the years." The Washington Post, 2011 10, 30. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/military-rations/index.html  
7 Cuong, Do. "Interview with Do Cuong, 1981." Vietnam: A Television History. Recorded 27 July 1981. WGBH. Web, 
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-470cbc-interview-with-do-cuong-1981. 
8 Halberstam, David. "Interview with David Halberstam, 1979 [part 2 of 5]." Vietnam: A Television History. Recorded 
16 January 1979. WGBH. Web, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-cbedc8-interview-with-david-halberstam-
1979-part-2-of-5. 
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optimistic” about sales as a result of the stalemate in Vietnam.9 Demand in the military 
remained high in 1990; that year, PMC donated 2 million Marlboros to troops serving in 
the Persian Gulf in response to handwritten notes from service members. Yet despite high 
consumption among troops and the potential for patriotic associations, soldiers are all but 
absent from cigarette advertisements until the Alvarez ad emerged twenty-three years 
after Vietnam ended. 
The creation of smokers’ rights and commercial speech 
 The Bill of Rights campaign, in the Alvarez ad and far beyond, also exploited the 
language of rights and freedoms, issues distinct from those of patriotism and the military. 
As in many public health issues, restrictions on cigarettes involve a trade-off between 
personal freedoms and collective well-being. To what extent does a health threat – an 
endemic disease, a toxic substance, or a sudden outbreak – merit an authoritarian 
response like quarantine, vaccination, or surveillance? The earliest public health 
advocates in the 19th to early 20th century, as sociomedical historian Ronald Bayer 
observes, did not hesitate to go to coercive extremes to fight infectious disease in the 
United States.10 Although tactics such as compulsory vaccination sparked local pockets 
of resistance, Bayer contends that it was not until the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s 
that a real national debate between public health and civil liberties resurfaced in the late 
20th century. HIV/AIDS activists emphasized a patient’s rights to refuse testing and to 
keep their infection status private, an argument which naturally rested on the individual’s 
rights taking precedence over a poorly understood threat to public well-being. 
 To Bayer, the patients’ rights discourse around HIV/AIDS became part of the 
general context that shaped other health discourses, including the one connecting 
smoking and freedom. With smoking, however, there are two levels of freedom at stake. 
The first level is the individual’s right to choose his own behavior, but the second level is 
more novel: the corporate freedom to sell and market a harmful product.  
The Bill of Rights campaign and the debate it provoked intersects both of these 
dimensions. The series invokes the rights to eat and drink as one pleases, and tacitly, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 British American Tobacco. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "Meeting of Committee of Directors Held at 
Westminster House, London on the 21st November 1967." Last modified 26 August 2006. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/raj96a99. 
10 Bayer, Ronald. "Talking Point: The continuing tensions between individual rights and public health." European 
Molecular Biology Organization Reports. no. 12 (2007): 1099-1103. 
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right to smoke as one pleases. While this “smoker’s rights” discourse was largely 
architected by the tobacco industry, writers on both sides of the tobacco debates have 
often made it their theme. The second level is the free speech rights of the cigarette firm, 
Philip Morris, to advertise and to sell a legal product. This issue, though sometimes 
conflated with the individual choice to smoke, is more often the subject of legal 
discussions, including the timeline adapted from Bayer’s scholarship below. 
There is no doubt that the industry invented smokers’ rights. The concept does not 
have organic origins, regardless of the spontaneous supporters it would later attract. The 
earliest known mention of “smokers’ rights” was in an industry trade magazine in 1976.11 
This off-hand remark turned into a movement by the late 1980s, as Philip Morris and 
other manufacturers actively recruited and organized smokers’ rights groups. Their 
strategy, an analysis of tobacco publications between 1987 and 1992 showed, was to 
convince consumers that smokers’ rights were under threat and then to promote political 
and social action against restrictions that these consumers could take.12 To many critics, 
the Bill of Rights campaign and the Alvarez Ad were the culmination of one and a half 
decades’ worth of lobbying and “grassroots” organizing to teach smokers about their 
apparent rights.13  
But since its origins in the industry, voices off the tobacco firms’ payroll have 
picked up the language of rights to stake their own positions. Anti-smoking advocates 
especially have learned to contest cigarette firms’ use of rights rhetoric. “The tobacco 
industry wants us to think of smoking as an inalienable right of all free people,” writes 
polemic anti-tobacco supporter Robert N. Proctor, “but how free is the amputee suffering 
from Buerger’s disease…?”14 In other words, since smoking limits freedom by causing 
disease, Proctor believes it cannot itself be a freedom.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cardador, M. Teresa, Anna R. Hazan, PhD, and Stanton A. Glantz, PhD. "Tobacco Industry Smokers' Rights 
Publications: A Content Analysis." American Journal of Public Health. no. 9 (1995). 
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.85.9.1212 
12 Same as previous. 
13 Katz, James E. "Individual rights advocacy in tobacco control policies: an assessment and 
recommendation." Tobacco Control. (2005). http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/14/suppl_2/ii31.full 
14 Proctor, Robert. Golden holocaust: origins of the cigarette catastrophe and the case for abolition. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011. Print. 
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Jacob Sullum, a libertarian commentator and Proctor’s ideological opposite, 
thinks scare rhetoric and “red herring questions” like this one lack logic.15 To Sullum, 
non-smokers’ rights and smokers’ rights are a false dichotomy; smokers “have the same 
rights as other individuals,” and thus, anything to limit their freedom of consumption 
limits all freedoms.16 Sullum and Proctor read like a concentrated synthesis of the views 
many commentators on the Bill of Rights campaign also express, although admittedly 
with greater self-consciousness to the public health versus individual rights balance.  
When Philip Morris collected public figures’ musings on freedom and rights, it 
didn’t just have the rights of smokers in mind; it was also fighting to reclaim its own 
freedom of speech. The beginning of this battle for commercial speech have their roots in 
the early 20th century. Critics as far back as the 1920s claimed cigarette advertisements 
would corrupt the youth and turn all of the United States into cigarette addicts, but in 
policy, the Federal Trade Commission’s power ended at strongly-worded statements.17 
Following the Surgeon General’s 1964 Report, the industry agreed to self-enforce its own 
Cigarette Advertising Code, prohibiting ads aimed at youth and ads with false health 
claims. Cigarette firms regularly violated these guidelines.18  
Starting in the 1970s, this window for unrestricted advertising began to tighten. In 
1971, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) secured the blessings of federal courts to 
recognize the government’s ability to regulate acts it termed commercial speech.19 
Previously, the FTC had required registered television and radio stations to air anti-
smoking messages in proportion to cigarette ads, but it now banned all cigarette ads in 
both mediums.20 Over the course of the 1980s, the Supreme Court developed guidelines 
to determine whether commercial speech merited constitutional protection: it must 
promote a legal activity, it must express an accurate message, and the government holds 
the burden of proof to demonstrate how restricting the speech will improve the public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Sullum, who has received minor or indirect funds from the tobacco industry, goes to pains to prove that accepting 
money to voice a view he already holds does not imply he is dishonest. 
16 Sullum, Jacob. For Your Own Good: The Anti-Smoking Crusade and the Tyranny of Public Health. Touchstone, 
1999. 
17 See note 11. 
18 Richards, J.W., J.B. Tye, and P.M. Fischer. "The tobacco industr'ys code of advertising in the United States: myth 
and reality." Tobacco Control. no. 4 (1996): 295–311. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1759528/  
19 Bayer points out that the U.S. is the only liberal democracy that affords advertising free speech rights usually 
associated with political speech.  
20 Bayer, Ronald. "Tobacco, Commercial Speech, and Libertarian Values: The End of the Line for Restrictions on 
Advertising?." American Journal of Public Health. no. 3 (2002): 356-359. 
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interest.21 If anyone had tried to prove that the Bill of Rights campaign fell under the 
legal restrictions of the FTC’s guidelines against cigarette advertisements on television 
and radio, then, its critics would have needed to make an argument that its message was 
false and that curtailing it would stop smoking. My intuition says they would have failed 
both tests. 
With that said, medical consensus by the 1990s was in favor of an all-out ban on 
cigarette ads; the American Medical Association, American Heart Association, American 
Lung Association, and American Public Health Association all endorsed this radical 
change. It is no wonder that after almost a century of increasing restriction and half a 
decade of focused attacks from the medical press, the cigarette industry would invoke the 
importance of constitutional freedoms in a high-profile branding campaign. 
Outlining the Bill of Rights campaign 
The Bill of Rights campaign evaded regulation not just by rallying meanings of 
military might and patriotism to its cause, nor just by wrapping itself tightly in 
constitutional freedoms. It’s big trump card was its stated content: the firm always 
maintained that the campaign intended to build corporate identity, not to hawk cigarettes 
or any other product. This distinction was key. The message, according to PMC, wasn’t 
that consumers should smoke a Marlboro in a toast to freedom, but that they should count 
on PMC as a stalwart of American rights. It was a brilliant maneuver; promoting 
corporate values, unlike promoting a hazardous substance, is perfectly legal. 
PMC said its campaign was timely given some recent changes to diversify its 
product line. Towards the end of 1988, Philip Morris Companies purchased Kraft, Inc., 
making it the world’s largest consumer goods company.22 23 On the heels of its big 
acquisition, the company argued that these ads representing its corporate identity were 
intended to promote all of its products, not just cigarettes. In terms of profits, though, 
Philip Morris Companies was hardly an even split between cigarettes and other goods. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Bayer, Ronald, Lawrence O. Gostin, Gail H. Javitt, and Alan Brandt. "Tobacco Advertising in the United States: A 
proposal for a constitutionally acceptable regulation." Journal of American Medicine Associetion. no. 22 (2002). 
22 The Associated Press. "COMPANY NEWS; Kraft Deal Settled, Philip Morris Says." The New York Times. sec. 
Business Day, December 6, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/06/business/company-news-kraft-deal-settled-
philip-morris-says.html  
23 Deutsch, Claudia H. "CASE STUDY: The Philip Morris-Kraft Merger; Why Bigness May Not Matter." The New 
York Times, sec. Business Day, October 23, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/23/business/case-study-the-philip-
morris-kraft-merger-why-bigness-may-not-matter.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm  
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1991, The New York Times reported that cigarettes accounted for 64 percent of PMC’s 
operating income, over twice the profits from its food and beer products.24 
Regardless of branding, the name Philip Morris, to some ears, will always mean 
cigarettes.25 For that reason and so many outlined below, the Bill of Rights campaign – 
tacitly, subtly – seemed to promote cigarettes and to safeguard the right to sell them. 
Combining conventional print and broadcast components with a 50-state tour of an 
original Bill of Rights facsimile, PMC found an innovative way to sidestep official 
censure while still attracting massive public attention (Figure 2). Dissecting this two-part 
campaign gives more inclusive context for how a message without the word cigarette can 
still goad consumers to defend the habit or stand more strongly against it.26 
The glossy scope of advertising 
As the year 1990 approached, the National Archives solicited donations from a 
variety of corporations to underwrite a nationwide celebration of the Bill of Rights 200th 
Anniversary. Offering a $600,000 donation to the Archives’ trust fund, Philip Morris won 
the sponsorship bid handily.  
From a legal perspective, this sponsorship was above board. The editorial page of 
the New York Times decried PMC’s $60 million advertising campaign as an effort “to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Uchitelle, Lewis. "Business Scene; The Soaring Cost Of Cigarettes." The New York Times, sec. Business Day, July 
30, 1991. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/30/business/business-scene-the-soaring-cost-of-cigarettes.html 
25  In fact, it’s worth noting that in 2003, Philip Morris Companies, Inc. changed its name to Altria Group, Inc., a 
rebranding move intended to emphasize that the company’s portfolio included far more than cigarette brands. Today, 
most of its income still comes from international and domestic tobacco sales. 
26 Predictably, most materials about the Bill of Rights campaign are available today through partisans and critics. On 
one side, anti-tobacco groups, most notably the Advocacy Institute (AI), left a useful paper trail of their efforts to 
combat Philip Morris’ advertising campaign. Congressional records of hearings and correspondence, while less central 
to my discussion, also represent the views of anti-tobacco crusaders in the government. On the other side, Philip Morris 
and its allies in the tobacco, food, and advertising industries – not to mention less obvious surrogates, including an 
industry lobbying group called the Tobacco Institute – have been compelled to release thousands of documents as part 
of legal settlements and court orders. Over 14 million of these documents, plus some other tobacco-related research, are 
now publically available the University of California’s Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 
(http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/). I found most of the primary sources used in this project, both sources supporting and 
opposing the tobacco industry, in this archive. 
At the same time, I have tried to supplement the biases and silences in my source material. For one thing, in 
order for a document to be included in the Legacy Tobacco archive at all, it must be a source either produced or 
appropriated by a tobacco firm or by a researcher aligned against tobacco firms. Tobacco companies like Philip Morris 
certainly had their ears pricked to any mention of their products – positive, negative, or neutral – but their paper trail 
runs especially thick whenever identifying and countering bad publicity. As a result, it can be difficult to decipher 
whether press coverage of the Bill of Rights campaign was in reality more negative than positive, or whether the 
negative coverage simply occupies a larger space in the archive since it required the extra effort of damage control. The 
same bias applies to scrutinizing the work of the Advocacy Institute and other anti-tobacco parties. Since the job of 
such groups, in part, is to amplify controversy, the newsletters and records they tend to leave behind can be an echo 
chamber of dissenting views. To try to fill in the gaps and compensate for these biases, I’ve also searched more 
comprehensive news and media archives. 
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rent the Bill of Rights” for the industry’s own ends, but admitted that it was within the 
Archives’ mandate.27 A spokeswoman for the Archives remarked that both Philip Morris 
and the Archives had engaged in such public-private partnerships in the past; other 
companies had helped the National Archives to finance the Constitution’s bicentennial 
events, and Philip Morris already had sponsored exhibits at the National Art Gallery.28 
For the promotion’s critics in Congress, the sponsorship issue was a dead end, but in the 
court of public opinion, many observers would contest PMC’s right to the National 
Archives’ stamp of approval.  
The whole campaign began with a traditional advertising effort, but a spectacle 
would follow – gallery showings, parades, lectures, a gala event, and a poster contest – 
but first came an onslaught of television, radio, and print ads. It’s difficult to compare the 
size and impact of these two efforts. In fact, even if the Bill of Rights’ TV, radio, and 
magazine spots were a more traditional method of promotion, they were no less 
impressive in scope or subtle in design than the more inventive parts of the effort that 
would follow. In either case, the advertising wave hit on November 1, 1989, flooding $60 
million into television, radio, and print markets across the United States. 
In tone, the television and print campaign both strike a pose of straight-faced 
solemnity. The 30-second television advertisement opens with a glowing document – 
ostensibly the Bill of Rights – ensconced in the atrium of a domed building with ionic 
columns reminiscent of the U.S. Capitol. Angelic choral music plays. “The freedom to 
say and think what we believe, to express our individuality and diversity – that’s our 
birthright,” intones a male narrator, “and it’s ensured by this document.” As in the print 
ads, the spot closes with the Philip Morris seal and an invitation to order a copy of the 
document free of charge.29 According to polling conducted for PMC, many viewers 
dialed that 1-800 number at the end of the ad; within its first two weeks, Philip Morris 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 "The Bill of Rights, for Rent." The New York Times, sec. Editorial, November 11, 1989. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/19/opinion/the-bill-of-rights-for-rent.html. 
28 Cabrera, Denise. "TWO CONGRESSMEN QUESTION ARCHIVES-CIGARETTE AGREEMENT." The 
Associated Press, November 15, 1989. http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Two-Congressmen-Question-Archives-
Cigarette-Agreement/id-a3c2dd7318d878c27640ad40f7cd8281 
29 Philip Morris Companies.. "1990 Philip Morris Companies Bill of Rights Commercial" Posted August 06 2012. 
Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD1---pYGjM. 
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fielded over 300,000 requests from viewers asking for a free copy of the Bill of Rights, 
and had distributed 1.5 million copies at poll time. 30 
If this seemingly generic ad lacks personality, the print campaign that followed it 
had almost an excess of personalities. Alvarez was in good company alongside former 
U.S. Presidents (Thomas Jefferson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln) as well as 
African American civil rights leaders (Benjamin Hooks and Barbara Jordan) and 
performers (James Earl Jones, Judith Jamison, and Louis Gossett Jr.).31 There was an ad 
in the series with hearing-impaired actress Marlee Matlin, another with the President of 
the University of Notre Dame, and a third with Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Polish 
Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.32 33 Each spot followed the same general format as the 
Alvarez Ad: an image of the speaker, followed by a moving quote from them on the 
meaning of the Bill of Rights.  
The reach, price, and context of print advertising are harder to peg than for 
television ads. The May 26, 1991 issue of Parade, released almost exactly a year after the 
Alvarez Ad, had a circulation of 35,314,497 copies.34 Of course, the Bill of Rights print 
campaign was also in other publications; the Alvarez ad in particular was also featured in 
the June 1990 issue of Ebony.35 Regardless of magazine and newspaper circulation, it 
seems print advertisements rather than television spots had the biggest impact on Philip 
Morris’ brand recognition indicators. A May 1990 poll of consumers for Philip Morris 
Companies and the advertising firm Ogilvy & Mather found that nearly 2/3 of consumers 
had been exposed to Philip Morris in magazines, more than in any other medium.36 
Besides designing the explicit advertisement, Philip Morris kept a close eye on 
the contexts in which ads were printed and aired. On television, PMC purchased 30 
second and 60 second spots on local, network, and cable stations, especially targeting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Decisions Center, Inc. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "THE PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES ADVERTISING 
TRACKING - WAVE I AND II." Last modified 10 March 2008. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ind70b00 
31 "Philip Morris Companies, Inc. Sponsor of Bill of Rights Tour; Observes 200th Anniversary." Jet, October 1, 1990. 
http://bit.ly/XAcVuR 
32 Philip Morris. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "For people like me the Bill of Rights is loud and clear." Last 
modified 11 June 2009. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wqd04b00. 
33 Bergson, Paul C. "A Bright, Shining Light." The Washington Post. sec. Letters, May 26, 1990. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/czu38b00/pdf  
34 Urice, James M. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "No Title." Last modified 2 February 2002. Accessed March 
21, 2013. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oot72f00. 
35 Ebony, June 1990. http://bit.ly/WgmPzL (accessed March 21, 2013). 
36 Philip Morris. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES "BILL OF RIGHTS" 
CAMPAIGN." Last modified 1 September 2008. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jfn51b00. 
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early morning, early evening, and prime time slots.37 While many advertisers seek to buy 
airtime during breaking news, Philip Morris even targeted specific breaking news events. 
Following South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela’s release from prison on 
February 11, 1990, PMC unexpectedly stepped up the Bill of Rights television campaign. 
Philip Morris originally had planned to resume Bill of Rights ads on February 12, but it 
moved its plans up a day to coincide with Mandela coverage. Among other requests, the 
food and cigarette conglomerate asked CNN if it could air Bill of Rights advertisements 
between 15-minute segments about South Africa. CNN declined the request due to 
scheduling uncertainty, but CNBC closed 13 reports on Mandela’s release with a Bill of 
Rights ad, as requested specifically by Philip Morris.38 
The art of the endorsement 
What exactly did Philip Morris hope to gain by linking itself to personalities like 
Mandela? Mandela was one figure whose prestige and pitch for rights PMC exalted to 
raise its own corporate identity. As referenced earlier, PMC included a variety of 
endorsers in its print ads, a move that would seem calculated to prove the Bill of Rights – 
not to mention Philip Morris products – is meant for everyone. In the same way that 
Alvarez was selected to convey a set of meanings, these other figures were also chosen to 
represent different facets of freedom, rights, and patriotism to different audiences. 
The art of the endorsement, and of how public figures can represent a range of 
values to audiences, was by no means a new advertising trope. 39 Historian Roland 
Marchand, who studies the cultural role of business and advertising in the early 20th 
century, dates the modern testimonial back to at least the 1920s, a moment of intense 
competition for consumers’ attention.  Cigarette industry leader Lucky Strike was an 
early adapter to the technique. Recruiting a vast variety of public figures – “from 
business tycoons and society women to athletes and women” – Lucky Strike used high-
profile endorsements to differentiate its product in a crowded market. By 1927, 
testimonials were so in vogue, one actress reportedly hawked 11 different products at one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid. 
38 David, Kiley. "BREAKING NEWS AS NELSON MANDELA WALKS FREE, THE MARLBORO MAN RIDES 
IN PHILIP MORRIS POSITIONS ITS 'BILL OF RIGHTS' ADS NEXT TO MANDELA COVERAGE." Adweek, 
February 19, 1990. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dhl85e00  
39 Because the range of personalities used for the Bill of Rights campaign includes broadly defined “public figures”, I 
am opting not to use the more commonplace term “celebrity endorsements” to describe them. The figures featured in 
the ads, in my opinion, are not an example of the emergent category of celebrity in the second half of the 20th Century. 
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time.40 Since then, cigarette firms have attracted an impressive range of endorsements; in 
the entertainment industry alone, the glamorous Marlene Dietrich, a young Ronald Regan 
(then a B-movie actor), and, most recently, actor Stephen Dorff are just a sampling of the 
countless many who have mugged for the industry. Public endorsements, then, are neither 
new to advertising strategies nor to cigarette ads in particular. 
But the Bill of Rights ads tweaked the typical endorsement format. None of the 
figures actually endorse a PMC product. (Some of them, indeed, never lived to witness 
the invention of the modern cigarette, so they never could have endorsed Philip Morris’s 
signature brands.) The figures give testimonials not about the taste or feel or pleasure of 
consumption, but about rights, freedoms, and patriotism. The long-honored American 
Presidents, distinguished civil rights leaders, and respected performers featured in the ads 
give their credible, expert opinion on a value system rather than on a stated consumer 
good, a value system the consumers could then associate with PMC’s corporate identity. 
In other words, the personality in the ad delivers this set of meanings from the brand to 
the consumer.41 
Or rather, the people in each ad deliver subtly adjusted meanings to different 
consumers. Walesa, the labor leader who would become President of Poland at the end of 
1990, provides one especially clear example of a figure positioned to appeal to a specific 
constituency with connotations of freedom different from those of the other figures in the 
campaign. It’s not a stretch to suppose that Thomas Jefferson, as a founding father from 
the United States’ colonial past, conveys a different idea of rights than Walesa. Similarly, 
while Jefferson’s iconic visage graces 5-cent nickels in the U.S., Walesa is a less 
recognizable figure to Americans.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Marchand, Roland. Advertising the American Dream, Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940. pp.98. London: Univ 
of California Press, 1986. 
41 There is some debate among scholars about how to interpret product endorsements by public figures. Consumer 
Studies professor Grant McCracken contends that the two dominant models for understanding celebrity endorsements – 
the source credibility model (celebrity endorsements work because consumers consider endorsers to be experts) and the 
source attractiveness model (endorsements work because the endorser is likable, familiar, and similar to the consumer) 
– are both inadequate. McCracken instead proposes that the power of the celebrity endorser lies in the meanings a 
celebrity brings to the ad, and transfers to the consumer through the product. With his ideas in mind, I loosely use a 
combination of source credibility/attractiveness models and McCracken’s meanings model to interpret this series of 
ads. McCracken, Grant. "Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of the Endorsement Process." Journal of 
Consumer Research. no. 3 (1989).  
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He would, however, be a potent symbol in Poland and the former Soviet bloc – 
and that’s exactly why, according to many observers, PMC courted his endorsement.42 
Following the break up of the Soviet Union, Philip Morris Companies immediately 
announced plans to enter markets in Eastern Europe.43 Even before the fall, Marlboros 
were the best-selling cigarette in the USSR, a statistic that included the government’s 
order of 22 billion Marlboros by the end of 1991, the largest export order ever for PMC. 
“Moscow truly is Marlborough Country,” declared a reporter hired by PMC upon visiting 
the Russian capital.44 
An independence leader known for his chain-smoking, Walesa was tailor made to 
continue guiding Eastern Europe into an era of American-style consumer freedoms. In a 
meeting with PMC’s Vice President of Corporate Affairs Guy Smith, Walesa agreed to 
be featured in ads promoting the American Bill of Rights for a fee between $20,000 and 
$25,000. Walesa’s spokespeople later admitted the labor leader had no idea his 
endorsement of human rights could be taken as a pitch for cigarettes, but some observers 
suggested the messages were one and the same to many people in Eastern Europe.45 “The 
right to smoke is political,” noted The Christian Science Monitor, even suggesting that in 
a society marked by government control of individual choice, some people valued the 
right to light up more than the right to vote.46 Grasping this popular spirit, Philip Morris 
pointed the Bill of Rights public relations machine towards Eastern Europe, appropriating 
Walesa’s image to further conflate consumption, freedom, and a resurgent Polish (rather 
than strictly American) patriotism. Mobilizing specific public figures to direct meanings 
at different consumers indeed seems to have been a powerful tool. 
The Bill of Rights, on tour 
With all of this in mind, PMC’s undeniable focus was the United States, not the 
USSR. The country-wide tour of a Bill of Rights facsimile expanded Philip Morris’ 
public face beyond television, radio, and print ads to a series of free, local events in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Barron, James H. "Smoke Signals in Eastern Europe." The Christian Science Monitor, October 23, 1990. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1023/dsmoke.html 
43 "Burnett Expands Into Eastern Europe." Adweek, April 1, 1991. 44	  Philip Morris Companies, Inc. "PM In Motion - Philip Morris Video Magazine." UCSF Tobacco Industry 
VideosRecorded 1990. Web, http://archive.org/details/zvp23e00. 
45 "Ex-smoker Walesa 'having second thoughts' about ad." USA Today, Final Edition edition, sec. News, May 25, 1990. 
46 Barron, James H. "Smoke Signals in Eastern Europe." The Christian Science Monitor, October 23, 1990. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1990/1023/dsmoke.html 
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celebration of the document’s bicentennial. The basic structure of the tour seemed 
innocent enough. Following almost a full year of promotional advertising, the tour began 
on October 10, 1990 in Barre, Vermont. The exhibit included a 5,000-square-foot 
pavilion with museum-style graphic displays and a “hexagonal-shaped audiovisual 
theater” to help visitors explore “past and contemporary civil liberties issues.”47 Fourteen 
months later, the tour ended with a weeklong celebration in Richmond, Virginia. Among 
other attractions, there was a parade with “costumed dignitaries” and “young 
people, bearing the flags of all 50 states,” a lecture series at the University of Richmond, 
and a gala.48  
Were any of these events the de facto soapbox for PMC to preach smokers’ rights, 
or were they a purer venue to celebrate key American values without a profit motive? 
The impact of PMC’s sponsorship on the content of the tour blurs the line between a 
promotion and laissez-fair goodwill donation. It’s not even clear which events on the 
agenda – on the most superficial level of financial influence – were even on Philip 
Morris’ dime. A PMC press release only identifies the gala, on behalf of the Virginia 
State Library, as being “underwritten” by PMC, but other anniversary events bare degrees 
of input beyond strict finances. An actor whose troupe impersonates colonial founders on 
educational tours recalled how Philip Morris contracted his group of players to appear at 
one of their Bill of Rights events. “They never put any words in our mouth,” he said. 
“They allowed us to write the scripts, interpret the Bill of Rights in a perfectly quality, 
historical way and left it at that.” In this case, then, PMC was content to hand its 
collaborators a blank check, permitting this group to explain less flattering details of 
tobacco’s history in colonial America.49 
 Unlike these historical impersonations, Philip Morris more noticeably influenced 
a series of one-off lectures, another element of the tour with an educational flavor. Again, 
however, the extent to which tour contributors adjusted their tune to support smoking 
rights isn’t immediately clear. A.E. Dick Howard, a law professor previously who spoke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 "PHILIP MORRIS CORPORATE AD CAMPAIGN CELEBRATES BILL OF RIGHTS BICENTENNIAL." PR 
Newswire. Date Accessed: 2013/03/18. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
48 "NATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS TOUR PLANS GRAND FINALE." PR Newswire. Date Accessed: 2013/03/18. 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
49 Roberts, Roxanne. "Coming Face to Face With History; Patriot Games: Latter-Day Washington, Jefferson Et al. 
Answer The Role Call." The Washington Post, Final Edition, sec. Style, July 4, 1992. 
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against labor laws permitting employers to discriminate against smokers, gave the series’ 
final session, but other lecturers were more cautious in their support.50 Rodney A. Smolla 
of the University of Richmond, in a legal testimony before the FDA a decade later, 
almost reluctantly recommended that Congress should “[steer] clear of the resurrection of 
[anti-tobacco] advertising restrictions” to avoid  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Geyelin, Milo. "The Job is Yours - Unless You Smoke." The Washington Post, April 21, 1989. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/documentStore/o/r/c/orc02f00/Sorc02f00.pdf  
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Figure 2. The original stops for the Bill of Rights tour. 
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a long First Amendment court battle.51 More significant than the views PMC’s tour did 
represent are the views they excluded: none of the professors featured favored a less 
libertarian opinion of this founding document. 
Philip Morris couldn’t control some other educational efforts on the tour. At 
nearly every stop, anti-Big Tobacco groups followed PMC’s trail to refute what they saw 
as misinformation in the Bill of Rights gimmick. An anti-tobacco group called the 
Advocacy Institute, lead by former Federal Trade Commission chairman and firebrand 
Mike Pertschuk, dubbed the tour the “Philip Morris' Bill of Rights Death March” and 
estimated the number of tobacco deaths over the course of the campaign.52 53 The 
activists used the tour as their chance to reclaim the rights and freedoms the industry had 
coopted on behalf of cigarettes. In one move, they ironically proposed rebranding the 
Statue of Liberty as a woman holding a cigarette called “Nicotina.”54 The parody statue 
imagined a world in which corporate sponsorship took over other national symbols of 
freedom - and didn’t like what it saw. If Philip Morris could sponsor the Bill of Rights, 
why not sponsor the Statue of Liberty, too? 
Even with this biting commentary, PMC’s tour schedule had the last laugh over 
the tools of the anti-tobacco lobby. The campaign launch not only marked a bicentennial, 
but also preceded the 13th Annual Great American Smoke Out on November 16 by just 
two weeks.55 Whether by design or not, the timing meant that both support and backlash 
for the Bill of Rights campaign worked its way into stories about the Great American 
Smoke Out celebrations, giving the tobacco firms an opportunity to upstage these events 
with their own showmanship. 
Between Education & Advertising 
On April 22, 1991, just as the Bill of Rights tour was scheduled to approach Los 
Vegas, good news came to a decidedly sleepier town. That day, Kingston, Massachusetts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Philip Morris. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF RODNEY A. SMOLLA 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS HEARING ON FDA 
JURISDICTION AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS 20020919." Last modified 15 March 2004. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ezr34a00 
52 Dolly, Langdon. "F.T.C. Chairman Mike Pertschuk Is the Bureaucrat Who Makes Some Businessmen Turn 
Blue." People Magazine, September 10, 1979. http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20074544,00.html  
53 Tobacco Institute. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "Advocacy Ihsiitgte." Last modified 30 November 2009. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xde49b00. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Philip Morris. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "PM FYI." Last modified 1 February 2002. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/aos24e00.  
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sixth-grader Kerry Shea won an all-expense-paid trip to Washington, DC, a total of 
$1,500 in U.S. Savings Bonds, a position as a special guest at an awards luncheon and 
gala event, and her own National Press Club photo-op among other honors.  
Why all the hoopla? Shea was one of three national winners out of nearly 10,000 
reported entries selected by Philip Morris in their “Spirit of Liberty: 1791-1991” 
poster contest. A national press release from PMC quoted the “soft-spoken schoolgirl” 
saying she participated in the contest simply because “[she liked] being free.” 
Aesthetically, the piece earned accolades for its “clean lines” – originally drafted in 
crayon – that depicted hands against the backdrop of the flag using cut paper. Despite a 
century of anti-smoking programs and rhetoric aimed at protecting children from Big 
Tobacco, Philip Morris had once again entered the classroom.56 
The Bill of Rights campaign, then, was not solely a fight over the meanings of 
sacred American values, but for who could pitch these values to the next generation. The 
Spirit of Liberty contest was only the latest volley in a centuries-long tug of war between 
cigarette marketers and anti-cigarette crusaders for the hearts and pocket change of 
American youth. In the United States, the fight over minors’ smoking habits had its roots 
in the late 19th Century. As Alan Brandt reviews in his comprehensive history of the 
cigarette as an American product, the dawn of advertising was the beginning of 
advertising to youth. Early tobacco tycoon James Duke’s pioneering merchandise in the 
1880s included collecting cards of actresses, sports, adventure, and Civil War figures to 
entice young (usually male) consumers (31).  
But the dawn of youth advertising was quickly followed by a backlash. 
Temperance movements against smoking and alcohol consumption in the 1890s called on 
girls and boys to pledge abstinence from these substances. Cigarettes, according to these 
voices, were a moral hazard to the young. Many critics linked childhood smoking to 
adolescent delinquency and street crime. Preventing youth smoking through educational 
curriculum became a major component of the moral crusade against cigarettes.57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Philip Morris Companies. "KINGSTON SIXTH GRADER HONORED AS NATIONAL WINNER IN SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY POSTER CONTEST." PR Newswire, sec. State and Regional News, April 22, 1991. 
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 It was Joe Camel, that “smooth character” of the 1990s, who provoked a 
renaissance in anti-tobacco youth campaigns a full century after teetotalers started their 
fight against youth uptake. When RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company launched the Joe 
Camel series in 1988, it opened the floodgates to a renewed wave of criticism. Children’s 
advocates feared that RJR designed the cartoon camel to seduce young viewers into 
buying cigarettes the same way a less nefarious character like Tony the Tiger lures them 
to his cereal brand. These fears were swiftly confirmed in 1991, when internal RJ 
Reynolds documents leaked to an ABC News reporter showed that Joe Camel was 
explicitly part of a wider strategy to hook young smokers.58 As research connecting Joe 
Camel to youth uptake of smoking mounted, the Surgeon General released 1994’s 
Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People, arguing that whether causal or not, 
tobacco ads targeting the young could only encourage the habit.59  
 In 1991, when the Spirit of Liberty contest was taking place, the fight over youth 
smoking had not yet reached this fever pitch. National and regional press releases like the 
one describing Shea’s award – one release for each of the 15 regional winners, 3 more for 
the national finalists, and 2 announcing the complete list of schoolchildren aged 10 to 18 
that had earned honors – raised some eyebrows as they made their way through the news 
wires, but were not the subject of organized attack in the same way the tour itself had 
been targeted. 
The cigarette industry’s growing footholds in local primary education systems 
had, however, generated some criticism. In 1990, the Washington, DC school district 
decided to accept some $1 million from Philip Morris, provoking a letter of outrage in the 
Washington Post.60  This gift, notably, was dwarfed by food and tobacco conglomerate 
RJR Nabisco’s donation of $30 million to precollege education the year before, the 
largest such corporate gift to this sector of education at the time.61 The trend in corporate 
giving to children’s charities and educational programming sponsored by private 
companies continued well outside the cigarette industry, with Nike, McDonald’s, Burger 
King, and others funding public service announcements and in-school teaching 	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material.62 Whether by direct monetary donations, by hosting educational competitions, 
or by giving out facsimiles of a historical document, Philip Morris and other firms were 
finding creative ways to blur the line between educational material and promotional ploy. 
PMC had muddied standards for legal ads and ads pitched to youth, but a trap was set for 
any lawmakers that stepped in to redraw those boundaries. 
Regulation versus Rights: Thomas Luken fights PMC 
 Congress took the bait. Philip Morris’ celebration of the Bill of Rights – 
ironically, if predictably – lured some lawmakers into renewed calls for limits to the First 
Amendment. The contest of the campaign itself put legislators in an uncomfortable 
position; their duty as public servants called for them to ensure constituents’ safety, but 
also their freedoms. Aligning itself with advertising agencies and other companies eager 
to preserve corporate speech rights, PMC was more than ready for the showdown. 
National legislative restrictions on cigarette advertisements, an action that 
necessarily limits free speech rights, had been in place for a two full decades in 1990. By 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, a contingent of congressmen was fighting to tighten 
restrictions or widen the ad ban even more. Some initiatives proposed in 1989 suggested 
curtailing advertisements in sports stadiums, ending sports sponsorship, levying a tax on 
cigarette ads, and enforcing stronger self-regulation guidelines. As of 1990, none of these 
efforts had met with much success. 
Representative Thomas Luken, an Ohio Democrat and Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials Committee on Energy & 
Commerce, was a leader in the Congressional battle against tobacco. In 1988 he proposed 
a ban of all tobacco advertisements, and in 1989, his subcommittee held hearings 
debating whether the government could lawfully limit tobacco advertisers to uniform 
black typeface on a white background.63  
Luken had particular ire for the Bill of Rights campaign. At a hearing on 
November 16, 1989, a written statement from Philip Morris asserted that the Bill of 
Rights ads were “not advertising Marlboro, or any other brand of cigarettes,” but Luken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Liesse, Julie. "Line between public service, paid ads blurs." Advertising Age, sec. News, October 8, 1990. 
63 Richard W., Pollay, and Carter-Whitney David. Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, "The History of Advertising 
Archives. More Chronological Notes on the Promotion of Cigarettes." Last modified 13 January 2013. 
hhttp://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dgp10j00. 
  DiPierro 24 
wasn’t buying it. In a letter to Philip Morris CEO Hamish Maxwell, Luken said the Bill 
of Rights advertisements were “really cigarette advertisements” and were thus unlawful 
under the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.64 Luken postulated that if Americans 
heard a cigarette manufacturer preaching the value of Constitutional rights, they would 
assume the firm’s real meaning was to naturalize the right to smoke. If that was the case, 
Luken and his committee hoped, they must pull the ads and cut the campaign short. 
But where was his proof? In the past, Philip Morris had made explicit connections 
between the Bill of Rights and “smokers’ rights”; in 1986, for example, the company 
created a “Great American Smoker’s Bill of Rights” to counter the American Cancer 
Society’s “Great American Smokeout”.65  Despite these precedents, Luken found it 
difficult to draw a connection between Philip Morris’ past discourse on smokers’ rights 
and its current campaign. The Bill of Rights ads and tour never named cigarettes. Luken 
would need evidence that Philip Morris nonetheless had the same intent as it did in 1986. 
In search of that purpose, Luken demanded “all documents in the possession, custody, or 
control of Philip Morris companies, Inc. (or any of its subsidiaries or agents) referring or 
relating to the purpose or effect of the Bill of Rights advertisements.” 
Many of the documents he sought – “memoranda, correspondence with Ogilvy & 
Mather, and any studies…of the effects of various proposed advertisements” – wouldn’t 
have given him much ammunition. Like the ads, the private correspondence between the 
two firms never mentions cigarettes specifically. One memo stated that the purpose of the 
campaign was “to increase awareness of the National Archives' celebration of the 200th 
Anniversary of the Bill of Rights and Phillip Morris Companies' sponsorship of this 
event.”66 At face value, Philip Morris had neither designed the campaign with smokers’ 
rights involved nor monitored the effect of the campaign on cigarette consumption. Two 
polls from independent marketing research firms monitored whether consumers were 
more likely to recognize or positively identify PMC following the Bill of Rights series – 
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not whether they were sympathetic to smokers’ rights.67 68 Increased cigarettes sales were 
never a metric either. 
Such documents, if Representative Luken ever attained them, would not have 
helped him to build his case. He did, however, find evidence of illegal intentions in press 
coverage of the Bill of Rights campaign. In Adweek earlier that year, an article 
paraphrased an unnamed Ogilvy & Mather executive admitting that “the campaign was 
designed, in part, to protect PM's right to advertise tobacco and beer against proponents 
of an ad ban.”69 Luken took note. Following the article, he invited O&M Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer Graham Philips to speak at an upcoming hearing. The response 
was a flat no. “I am bewildered as to why you have invited him to speak since Ogilvy & 
Mather does not have a cigarette account, nor do we do any tobacco advertising,” came 
the reply from the firm’s general council.70 In the face of stonewalling, beyond Adweek’s 
paraphrase and wide speculation in the press, there is no evidence that Ogilvy & Mathers 
or Philip Morris ever acknowledged their campaign as an effort to preempt an ad ban on 
tobacco or alcohol. 
Philip Morris wasn’t about to take efforts at tightened regulation lying down. 
They certainly had the resources to fight back. In 1988, a year before it launched the Bill 
of Rights campaign, Philip Morris was riding high.71 Even when cigarette industry sales 
declined overall, Philip Morris posted gains. With its hefty profits, Philip Morris 
Companies was the second-most prolific advertiser in the United States. As legislation 
threatened to unseat it from its advertising throne, it took cover behind a new group, the 
Leadership Council on Advertising Issues.72 The group, which also represented the 
interests of General Foods, Mars Inc., Ogilvy Group, Procter & Gamble Co. and Time 
Inc., sought to fend off advertising taxes and other restrictions.73 By moving in this 
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direction, Philip Morris repositioned itself as fighting for free speech rights, not for the 
right to sell a product biomedicine had long ago confirmed to be hazardous. 
To fill in the gaps left by congressional lobbying, Philip Morris turned part of its 
advertising clout towards exercising its own right to public advocacy. In 1989, a pro-
smoking lobbying group that included representatives from Philip Morris called the 
Tobacco Institute placed advertisements in 19 major American newspapers, claiming that 
a majority of Americans did not support a ban on cigarette advertising.74 The claim, it 
turned out, was false. A closer breakdown of the same data by the Washington Post 
showed that a plurality of Americans in fact supported partial regulations and restrictions 
on cigarette ads. Statistical discrepancies aside, whether PMC acknowledged a 
connection between this ad and the coincident Bill of Rights campaign, the threat of 
advertising restriction clearly ranked among their concerns. 
The Right to the Rights: journalists & advocates in the media 
 The debate wasn’t just an inside the Beltway affair. As the Bill of Rights tour 
made its way across the country, so did a debate about the campaign in the local press of 
cities on and off the Bill of Rights trail. Anticipating or reacting to a nearby tour stop, 
some local editorial pages and talk show hosts buzzed with opinions on the Philip Morris 
campaign. In particular, people contested or supported Philip Morris’ notion of 
Constitutional rights. 
 Most reactions to the advertising campaign were negative. The Tallahassee 
Democrat of Florida was furious about the tour. “The Bill of Rights seems to be part of a 
sophisticated marketing plan attempting to portray smokers as victims of an intolerant 
society,” they observed. “Smokers are victims – of a highly addictive habit.”75 For these 
writers, if PMC put its logo on an ad for rights, it was automatically an ad for smoking 
and advertising rights. In Maine, an editorial in the Kinnebec Journal tried to reconcile 
regard for the actual Bill of Rights with the need to limit the rights of smokers and 
cigarette advertisers for a public good. The ads, to them, had an “unholy odor”; locals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Morin, Richard. "Tobacco Institute Ads Shaded Truth." The Washington Post, January 26, 1989. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mpl14e00/pdf  
 
75 "Bill of Rights as Marketing Tool." Tallahassee Democrat, January 26, 1991. 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jkj12f00/pdf  
  DiPierro 27 
could visit the local tour stop if they wished, but they were advised to “hold [their] 
nose.”76  
In one case, a journalist used Philip Morris’ public relations gimick to do his own 
riff on Constitutional rights. Reporter and non-smoker John D. Callaway proposed a stunt 
to counter the tour in which he pledged to “smoke a Philip Morris cigarette in full view of 
reporters…as a health-sacrificing act of support for the campaign for the U.S. Bill of 
Rights.”77 Callaway, clearly, was thumbing his nose at the idea that smoking a cigarette 
was an appropriate show of solidarity with Constitutional freedoms. When someone at 
Philip Morris got ahold of the article, they forwarded it along to Vice President of 
Corporate Affairs Guy Smith. “I think,” read a modest, handwritten note in the top 
margin, “he is challenging you.”78 
While many journalists and editors spoke from a position of independence, 
obvious partisans stirred much of the ruckus over the campaign. Some writers observed 
that PMC wasn’t selling the Bill of Rights at all; the only bill it cared about was the sales 
tab for cigarettes. “Philip Morris says it wishes to show the American people the Bill of 
Rights,” said one representative of the New York State Coalition on Smoking, “[but] we 
feel the company wants to sell them a bill of goods to improve its own tarnished image.” 
The Advocacy Institute tried to reclaim the rights discourse with a pamphlet called “the 
Philip Morris Bill of Wrongs,” in which it accused PMC of silencing free speech with its 
economic clout.79 Bob Keeshan, better known as Captain Kangaroo, chimed in with his 
own “Passionate Nonsmoker's Bill of Rights.”  
People in favor of the Bill of Rights campaign came from outside and inside the 
industry. A few independent voices made earnest pleas in the name of First Amendment 
rights on behalf of PMC. An editorial in conservative newspaper The Washington Times 
condemned Representative Luken’s efforts to take the Bill of Rights advertisements off 
the air as “a congressional inquisition.” More than inquisitorial, though, the Times 
challenged Luken’s logic. “A Philip Morris subsidiary makes cigarettes, the ads mention 
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Philip Morris, so the ads promote cigarettes,” the editorial said, reviewing Luken’s 
stance. “By such reasoning, it is illegal for Philip Morris to say anything about, well, 
anything.”80 Not all of the Bill of Rights campaign’s supporters were ideologically 
conservative. Advertising Age, which at other times criticized PMC’s Bill of Rights 
tactics, published an editorial conceding that even if most Americans opposed cigarette 
advertising, the Bill of Rights itself “was fashioned to protect unpopular minority 
positions” like those of Big Tobacco.81 The Boston Herald (though it, too, also published 
critiques of the series) said the firm wasn’t promoting cigarettes, but “one of the great 
charters of human freedom.”82 
 But the masters of rights and democracy discourse were representatives of the 
tobacco industry itself. Guy Smith told The World that Philip Morris supported the 
project to give every American “an opportunity to see this extraordinary document, 
which embodies many of our democratic traditions.”83 In a special guest column for USA 
Today, Smith acknowledged criticism of PMC’s tour and ad campaign, adding that the 
Bill of Rights “protects even such an extreme view” as suggesting the ads were illegal. 84 
For the tobacco industry’s critics and supporters alike, the conversation about the Bill of 
Rights campaign was never really about health – it was about rights.  
Veterans read the Alvarez Ad 
This long zoom out puts the Alvarez Ad in the contexts of cultural meanings, 
legal background, the Bill of Rights campaign, Congressional versus corporate battles, 
and mass media debate. I will now briefly zoom in, concentrating on a few voices to 
suggest how Alvarez fit into this cacophony of precedents and responses. The two letters 
in this section, both written by Vietnam veterans, are more personal than the general 
editorials and official statements reviewed earlier. The readers of the ad make judgments 
about whether or not the rights and freedoms Philip Morris Companies espoused in their 
ads were the same ones Alvarez represented during his service and so highly valued 	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thereafter. For one letter-writer, these rights were one in the same; for the other, Philip 
Morris distorted Alvarez’s vision of freedom by using him to sell a deadly product. 
 The first is a letter to the editor in The Washington Post. The letter writer doesn’t 
identify himself as a Vietnam veteran – he simply signs his name, Paul C. Bergson. A 
little research sheds some light on his motives for writing: not only is Bergson a retired 
U.S. Army Reserves Major General who served in Vietnam, but he is also a former 
Chairman of the Tobacco Institute Executive Committee. 85 86 Responding to an op-ed 
condemning the promotions that included the Alvarez ad, Bergson said Alvarez would 
probably defend the freedom of speech of Philip Morris’s critics. “Of all the people who 
will ever see the Philip campaign, Alvarez – undoubtedly – has the greatest appreciation 
for the Bill of Rights,” Bergson wrote.87 While his positive reaction to the Alvarez ad 
must be influenced by his affiliation with the tobacco industry, Bergson’s reaction in 
defense of freedom is something many Veterans must also share. 
Another response was not so rose-colored. Russell E. Shaw, a psychologist and 
Vietnam veteran who served at Bien Hoa Air Base in 1964 when the North Vietnamese 
captured Alvarez, reacted with disgust at the ad. “It is not evil enough for you to push 
your drug (nicotine) with deceitful advertising, now you wrap yourself in the Bill of 
Rights and use the life of a Vietnam Veteran to promote your right to sell tobacco, at any 
cost,” Shaw wrote. PMC worked against freedom, Shaw continued, an affront to a man 
like Alvarez, who fought for it. As a casual former smoker who preferred cigars as a way 
to emulate commanding officers like United States Air Force General Curtis Lemay, 
Shaw lived through a time when smoking was a meaningful and ubiquitous gesture for 
men in the services.88 Shaw, who studied ontology and philosophy, now believes that 
selling tobacco is an act of harm just as bad as war. “One of the lessions [sic] I learned in 
the Viet Nam war is that I cannot harm another human being without harming myself,” 
he wrote in his letter. “I don't know what it does cost you for the way you do business but 
I do know it does cost you.”89 In his reading of the Alvarez Ad, tobacco limits freedom, 	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so it was a contradiction to sell tobacco in the name of the freedoms Alvarez honored 
while in captivity. 
“How Sweet Freedom Can Be”: Alvarez in context 
 One crucial perspective on the Alvarez ad I’ve excluded so far is the opinion of 
Alvarez himself. Who is Everett Alvarez, and how does he feel about Philip Morris using 
his picture and quotes in their marketing campaign?  
From the ad itself, we know that Alvarez was a U.S. Navy pilot, and that in 1964 
his plane was shot down over the Gulf of Tonkin. We know he was the longest-held 
prisoner of war held by North Vietnam. Since his years in captivity – including capture 
by the North Vietnamese and a stay in the so-called “Hanoi Hilton” prison for American 
soldiers – he’s been committed to public service at home. Before this advertisement was 
published, Alvarez served as the Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration 
(VA), and more recently, on the President’s Task Force to improve Health Care Delivery 
for our Nation’s Veterans. Today he’s on the Library of Congress Veterans History 
Project Five Star Council Advisory Committee. In other words, Alvarez is active in the 
Veteran’s community, concerned about the health of his fellow soldiers, and aware of 
how historians will tell his story. 
In a telephone interview, Alvarez spoke to me about how he became a prominent 
speaker for Vietnam Veterans and what he thinks of the ad. Alvarez says Philip Morris 
asked him to speak about whether he would support a constitutional amendment honoring 
the U.S. flag as a celebration for Flag Day. He willingly volunteered; as a prisoner of 
war, he remembered the special reverence he and other soldiers placed on the flag even as 
their captors dishonored it. Alvarez says he never connected Philip Morris’s motives to 
an effort to promote smokers rights; even as a former smoker, it didn’t occur to him. 
With this small deception aside, it seems the ad represents Alvarez’s perspective 
on freedom since coming home fairly. Rather than react with anger when his captors 
showed him films of the anti-war movement in the U.S., Alvarez says he and other POWs 
told the North Vietnamese free protest was evidence of American freedoms. He also 
connects freedom with access to commodities. Alvarez has spoken about what it’s like to 
live without basic necessities, and how he values physical things – “clothing, shelter, 	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things like this” – more since his captivity. Alvarez, unlike some who spoke on his 
behalf, does not appear so perturbed by a cigarette firm telling his story. 
Conclusion: Who has the right to history? and other unresolved questions 
As this study has tried to show, Alvarez’s opinion is really just one voice in a 
generations-long conversation about how rights, freedoms, and patriotism fit into public 
health priorities. My goal has been to explain a moment in the cigarette debates and a 
relative blip in the media cycle by putting these conversations in various contexts. To 
understand the Bill of Rights campaign– to understand, more importantly, why smokers 
and non-smokers found it so provocative – I’ve suggested smoking is not exclusively a 
public health issue. Historical research, in this sense, can enrich the public health debate 
on cigarettes. The contexts I outline above – the recent genealogy of rights, freedoms, 
and patriotism as they pertain to smoking, Philip Morris’ extensive public relations ploys, 
endorsements by public figures as a deliberate choice, the fight over who should sponsor 
civics lessons in school, Congressional restraint of free speech, media responses both 
positive and negative, and the personal reflections of veterans and Alvarez himself – 
comprise just one list of many possible influences on consumer choice and reactions to 
advertising material. 
 By this summary, I do not mean to reach a simplifying conclusion. The questions 
raised by the Bill of Rights bicentennial campaign, and by the Alvarez Ad in particular, 
do not have tidy answers. One issue is whether the Bill of Rights celebration was a 
deliberate statement on smoking and advertising cigarettes. Philip Morris’ corporate 
goodwill tour and branding plan – even if neither ever references a PMC product– 
definitely manipulates the theme of freedom and rights in a way that would benefit 
PMC’s ability to advertise and sell cigarettes. After over a decade of orchestrating 
smokers’ rights groups and finding loopholes in the limits on its own freedom of 
corporate speech, Philip Morris and other actors in the industry primed consumers to 
think twice about a cigarette firm’s call for civil liberties. At the same time, there is no 
definitive proof in their external or internal documentation that would suggest this was 
the agenda they had in mind. 
 The popular consensus, however, was that their pitch for rights was tacitly a 
message meant to defend smokers. Many thought it was disgusting for a corporation to 
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cover its hazardous activities in the legacy of America’s founders. But if not Philip 
Morris, then who is permitted to be an advocate for a nation’s past? Who can appropriate 
history, and to which ends? These issues, although they arise implicitly during many 
moments of this study, will also be unresolved.  
Philip Morris itself was the first to bring the theme of history to the fore with its 
announcement of the Bill of Rights tour. “You’ll be enveloped by history, transported 
into the present, and reenter the world with a new appreciation of our freedoms,” their 
first ad promised. Then, it went further, promising viewers “a blockbuster experience” of 
the famous document. In this ad, Philip Morris considers history a resource to be tapped 
in the present; it is something that gives people virtue, but it also can be exploited for its 
entertainment value. The question of the right to history once more surfaced in the debate 
over whether the National Archives should seek corporate sponsorship, and whether it 
was ethical to accept PMC’s money. In this example, it also seemed as if history was a 
resource – but more like a National Park or common good that must be shielded from 
spoilers rather than rented out to them.  
Perhaps it is worth more than a brief mention to observe that Everett Alvarez, Jr. 
himself currently serves on a committee of the Library of Congress, an institution whose 
job is to catalogue the past for the benefit of the future. Critics of the Bill of Rights 
campaign were hesitant to entrust history to a corporation, but I imagine they would have 
no qualms trusting national artifacts to a library or museum. This study and many like it 
would not exist if archives did not prove themselves trustworthy. Without accessible, 
public, and unedited archives, after all, the Alvarez Ad would be lost to this history. In 
that sense, it is fitting that Alvarez should turn out to be a steward of this same cause. 
